During the 1920s, after the Battle of Anoual, France offered military backing to Spain to aid in securing control over the Rif region. Approximately forty years afterward, General De Gaulle furnished technological and scientific support to Franco as part of Spain’s endeavor to develop an atomic bomb, with intentions for testing it in Western Sahara.
Following Morocco's recapture of Tan-Tan and Tarfaya in 1958, Spain under Francisco Franco became increasingly worried that this surge of independence movements might ultimately compel it to abandon Western Sahara, which it had controlled since 1884. In response to this perceived danger, Franco turned to seek backing from another prominent military figure-turned-statesman: Charles de Gaulle, who had newly assumed leadership in France.
Both leaders shared a common distrust of Morocco’s ambitions to restore its Cherifian Empire. This was evident in France’s role in facilitating Mauritania’s independence on November 28, 1960—a move that Morocco refused to recognize until 1969.
According to Francisco Gómez Balcázar in The Mystery of the Spanish AtomicBomb In the early 1960s, this Franco-Gaulist partnership transcended political boundaries. Charles de Gaulle and Francisco Franco reached an agreement enabling Spain to pursue the development of nuclear weaponry. The arrangement included establishing a reactor not under the purview of either the IAEA or the American nuclear oversight body. This collaboration provoked anger within the United States and propelled what was once merely a peripheral scientific endeavor initiated by a team of Spanish scientists in 1948 into becoming a fully-fledged national program controlled at the governmental level.
Fortune was also on Spain’s side. In 1966, an American military aircraft crashed into the sea near Galicia with two nuclear bombs aboard. The Spanish authorities succeeded in recovering one of these devices, which provided valuable knowledge about nuclear technology. As Balcázar points out, "The accident acted as a catalyst for Spain's nuclear energy officials, reviving their initiative."
The Loss of Sidi Ifni Speeds Up Spain’s Nuclear Ambitions
By 1969, Franco encountered increasing pressure from the southern liberation forces of Morocco and was eventually compelled to relinquish control over Sidi Ifni. This setback intensified Spain’s resolve to pursue the development of an atomic bomb, with plans for testing it in Western Sahara during the early 1970s—a move reminiscent of de Gaulle’s previous choice to carry out France’s initial nuclear tests in the part of the eastern Sahara under French occupation.
Nonetheless, Spain’s plans for nuclear development were never realized. King Hassan II prioritized the recovery of Western Sahara throughout his rule, particularly following two attempted coups in 1971 and 1972. Leading up to the Green March on November 6, 1975, he launched a robust global diplomacy effort and successfully obtained an advisory ruling from the International Court of Justice to back Morocco’s assertion over the region.
The demise of Franco effectively brought an end to Spain’s nuclear ambitions. Upon his ascension, King Juan Carlos showed little inclination towards military conflict with Morocco to retain control over Western Sahara. Rather, his priority was healing the nation and restoring faith in the monarchy following years of discord during Franco’s rule.
When the Socialist Party assumed control in 1981, Spain's nuclear ambitions were formally abandoned. By 1987, under Prime Minister Felipe González’s administration, the country had endorsed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, effectively concluding Spain's pursuit of nuclear goals permanently.
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